



Director of
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SOUTH AFRICA - NAMIBIA: Military Operations

South African officials say they have killed, captured, or dispersed several hundred SWAPO guerrillas who recently infiltrated northern Namibia and that clearing operations will take about two months. [REDACTED]

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South African and Angolan officials have concluded a second round of talks at Cape Verde. According to press reports, an Angolan official indicated little progress was made on a disengagement agreement, although the two sides agreed to meet again. [REDACTED]

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Comment: [REDACTED] Pretoria may have sent about 2,000 troops to the border area since early this month [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In addition to counterinsurgency operations in northern Namibia, the South African forces probably are conducting sweep operations around their buffer zone in southern Angola. They are unlikely to go farther north without Mirage support and troop reinforcement. [REDACTED]

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South African claims of massive SWAPO infiltration may be exaggerated. Although the rainy season favors infiltration, Pretoria's occupation of the buffer zone since 1981 has substantially reduced the guerrillas' ability to cross into Namibia. There is as yet no indication that infiltrators have increased the casualty rate among civilians in Namibia. [REDACTED]

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Pretoria has already used the infiltrations to justify downgrading its delegation to the Cape Verde talks. It may use them to prepare its own population and foreign audiences for a new ground attack on SWAPO bases deep in Angola. [REDACTED]

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SURINAME: Uneasy Anniversary

Suriname's "revolution" enters its fourth year today with Army Commander Bouterse and a small group of his backers still in control, but Bouterse is highly concerned about the future of his regime. [redacted]

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In addition, Bouterse still fears Surinamese exiles will try to topple him in the near future. He recently announced plans to organize local networks of loyal informants, which will be similar to Cuba's Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. [redacted]

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Comment: Bouterse's inability to reconcile competing interests among the leftists puts him in a difficult position. He has already incurred the enmity of nearly all interest groups and the population, and he cannot afford to alienate his remaining supporters. [redacted]

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The low-key festivities marking the anniversary have not been widely publicized, suggesting Bouterse fears they might cause security problems. [redacted]

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[redacted] As the pressure on him mounts, he will be more likely to react to real or imagined threats with increasingly arbitrary policies. [redacted]

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USSR: Andropov on the Economy

The article by General Secretary Andropov in Kommunist urging improvements in the organization and management of the economy, sets strict limits on new approaches to exclude market socialism and to retain the basic system of centralized planning. [redacted]

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Andropov blames poor management and organizational impediments for contributing to the economy's poor performance in recent years. His only specific proposal, however, is to make greater use of differentiated wages as a means of promoting higher productivity. [redacted]

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The General Secretary says an awareness that rewards will be based on performance "disciplines people better than any persuasion." He adds that, in the past, wage increases without a corresponding rise in productivity caused shortages and consumer demands that could not be fully met. [redacted]

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Comment: The article probably is intended to encourage economic leaders to provide concrete solutions to existing problems in advance of a reported Central Committee plenum on economic issues to be held this spring. Andropov, however, still has not made a clear statement regarding overall direction of his economic policies. This suggests the leadership has not decided on a comprehensive economic program. [redacted]

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Andropov seems to be trying to disassociate himself from the economic policies and resultant failures of the Brezhnev era. A more differentiated wage policy would be a departure from Brezhnev's tendency to equalize wages. [redacted]

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The price hikes that occurred earlier this month suggest the leadership intends to seek a closer balance between the availability of consumer goods and purchasing power. New proposals may be made at the plenum. [redacted]

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EL SALVADOR: Government Pacification Plan

The coalition government--in anticipation of the Pope's visit on 6 March--has blunted guerrilla calls for negotiations by introducing a national peace plan. [redacted]

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President Magana on Wednesday announced a program for national pacification, which was signed by all nine members of the multiparty Political Commission. The declaration formally rejects the insurgent proposal for dialogue and calls on the left to lay down its arms and participate in presidential elections scheduled for early 1984. [redacted]

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A peace commission reportedly will be appointed today and will coordinate its efforts with political and human rights bodies already established by the government. The commission will be charged with devising and implementing an amnesty law and making recommendations aimed at revamping civil codes, the criminal justice system, and the electoral process. [redacted]

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Comment: At a minimum, the program is a propaganda breakthrough for the government, which is plagued by internal divisions and a poor public image. On the eve of the papal visit, the initiative provides an important symbol of the government's commitment to a political resolution of the war. It also could help strengthen Magana's efforts to promote human rights and civil liberties to prepare the country for elections. [redacted]
[redacted]

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USSR: Gromyko's Remarks on INF

Foreign Minister Gromyko's tough remarks on INF on Wednesday are intended to counter recurrent suggestions in the West that, after NATO begins INF deployment, Moscow will adopt a compromise position to limit those deployments in return for limits on Soviet SS-20s. Gromyko told TASS that the INF negotiations were making no headway. He said the West is deluding itself that the talks can continue "as if nothing had happened" after NATO begins deploying missiles. [redacted]

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Comment: The Soviets have at times suggested in Geneva they would negotiate after the initial INF deployments, but on a new basis, with Moscow announcing the deployment of new or additional weapon systems and then offering to trade these off against NATO deployments. Gromyko's warning the talks would not continue "as if nothing had happened" probably was intended to allow for such a possibility. Gromyko presumably wants to add fuel to the debate on INF before the West German elections, the outcome of which are likely to determine Moscow's next substantive moves on INF. [redacted]

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USSR-CHINA: Indirect Soviet Criticism

Moscow media on Wednesday published a TASS account of an article in the Laotian Party Central Committee newspaper critical of China. Beijing was accused of a wide range of hostile activities toward Laos, including "military provocations" at the border, and of trying to create insurgent groups among the people of northern Laos. [redacted]

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Comment: This publicity and the similar use recently in Soviet media of Vietnamese criticism of China seem intended to offset Chinese demands that the USSR halt its support for Vietnamese control of Kampuchea. Such reports are not new, but the USSR had not previously publicized them. The decision to do so now presumably was taken in the context of the resumption of Sino-Soviet talks on Tuesday in Moscow. Although Soviet media continue to mute direct criticism of China, the objective of putting pressure on Beijing is achieved by the replay of such criticisms. [redacted]

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MEXICO: Food Shortages and Austerity

Imports of 5 million tons of corn this year--largely under US Government credits--are helping relieve critical shortages, but government-subsidized sales are adding to the already serious deficit. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] tortilla makers went on strike on Tuesday demanding relief from price controls because of rising costs. Labor leaders are demanding the price freeze on basic foods continue, predicting food riots within 90 days if prices rise.

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Comment: This is one of many dilemmas the government is encountering as it tries to satisfy IMF requirements while preserving political support. President de la Madrid cannot afford to alienate labor or risk food riots. As a result, government expenditures are likely to rise to cover the cost of imports, driving the budget even further into deficit. [REDACTED]

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PERSIAN GULF: Results of Council Meeting

Foreign Ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council-- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman--accomplished little during their meeting in Riyadh last weekend, according to the US Embassy in Jidda. The war between Iran and Iraq dominated the discussion, with the Saudis particularly angry about the joint statement of support for Iran issued last month in Damascus by Syria, Libya, and Iran. Contrary to some press reports, oil policy was not on the agenda. The issues of military cooperation and internal security also were not addressed. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The members of the council, despite their unhappiness with Syria, remain unwilling to take retaliatory measures. Council military leaders have only begun to grapple with the problems of coordinating operations of their independent military establishments. A Saudi proposal for a security pact is distrusted by some of the smaller states, especially Kuwait, that believe it would allow Saudi interference in their internal affairs. [REDACTED]

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TANZANIA: Cabinet Changes

The cabinet shakeup announced on Wednesday by President Nyerere is aimed at strengthening the government's ability to cope with acute economic troubles that led to a military coup attempt last month. Edward Sokoine was appointed Prime Minister, a post he held from 1977 to 1980. He replaces Cleopa Msuya, who was named Minister of Finance. Foreign Minister Salim retains his position. [redacted]

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Comment: The changes are unlikely to ease the country's economic difficulties in view of their magnitude and Nyerere's unwillingness thus far to modify his doctrinaire socialist approach. Although many members of the new cabinet are competent, Sokoine and other key appointees are cautious men who probably will not challenge the President's policies. Further military plotting is likely as the economic situation continues to deteriorate. [redacted]

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SENEGAL: Presidential Election

Pro-Western President Abdou Diouf, who has served as interim President since 1980, is likely to win easily in the national election on Sunday. Diouf and his moderate Socialist Party are running against eight weak opposition parties that range from conservative to radical. Diouf has encouraged multiparty politics in one of Africa's most democratic political systems. [redacted]


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Comment: Diouf's most difficult postelection challenge will be to preserve political stability while continuing to implement austerity measures needed to stem Senegal's declining economy. If economic conditions deteriorate markedly, Diouf may request additional US economic and military aid, which will total almost \$50 million this year. Senegal makes Dakar airfield available as an emergency landing site for the NASA space shuttle [redacted]
[redacted]

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Special Analysis

NORTH AFRICA: Impact of Libya's Failed Plot

The failure of Tripoli's latest plot to oust Sudanese President Nimeiri probably will make Libyan leader Qadhafi cautious for a time. Over the longer term, however, he will continue his pursuit of the Nasir-inspired goal of bringing the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa into an Arab-Islamic sphere of influence that rivals the superpowers. Qadhafi will see the US and particularly men like Nimeiri and Egyptian President Mubarak--whose Arab credentials are suspect in his eyes--as enemies of this goal. The persistence of the Libyan threat is likely to translate into further appeals from regional states for discreet US military support. [redacted]

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Qadhafi appears content at this time to try to salvage a propaganda victory in the aftermath of the coup attempt. Tripoli has launched an aggressive campaign to publicize US "provocations," and has loudly protested its innocence to the international media and the UN Security Council. [redacted]

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Qadhafi's domestic position probably has not been damaged. The media campaign condemning Washington plays on the traditional xenophobia of Libyans, and it will distract them from their mounting dissatisfaction over Qadhafi's repressive and often inept "revolution" as long as he can sustain the fear of a US military threat. [redacted]

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The Libyan leader almost certainly will continue to try to oust Nimeiri. Qadhafi hates Nimeiri for having "betrayed" early unity pacts with Libya, for supporting Camp David and the late President Sadat, and for being weak and reliant on the US. [redacted]

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Anti-Egyptian activity also is possible, but probably will consist primarily of rhetoric. Qadhafi had hoped Mubarak would be more amenable than Sadat to Libyan entreaties, but the vitriolic personal attack on Mubarak by Tripoli Radio last Saturday seems to indicate this hope has been abandoned. If he anticipates Egyptian-US retaliation, Qadhafi may try to improve his fluctuating relations with Algeria, Tunisia, and perhaps even Morocco.

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Qadhafi's most likely next move is to intensify his efforts to topple Chadian President Habre, another obsession of the Libyan leader. That would make Sudan more vulnerable and embarrass Egypt and the US.

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In addition, Qadhafi may seek greater help from the USSR in any form that could deter US efforts against him. Libya's obvious failure in managing the coup, the appearance of US air and naval power on the eve of the move, and the warnings of US officials in the aftermath probably will prompt Qadhafi to accelerate the trend toward closer cooperation with Moscow. Despite its wariness about Qadhafi's policies, the USSR would be likely to welcome the opportunity to acquire greater access to Libyan air and naval facilities

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The View in Khartoum

The failure of the coup attempt has reduced but not eliminated the potentially serious threat to the Nimeiri regime from Sudanese dissidents. The likelihood that Qadhafi will make further efforts to oust Nimeiri

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will contribute to uneasiness among Sudanese officials. Small cross-border raids by Libyan-backed Sudanese dissidents based in Ethiopia probably will continue.

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Longer range political stability in Sudan continues to depend on the loyalty of the military, Nimeiri's principal power base. Although there have been increased criticism of the regime by some junior and middle-grade officers, Nimeiri appears to retain the support of most of the armed forces. Over time, however, the inability of the government to reverse the nation's steady economic decline could lead to widespread civil disturbances and Nimeiri's overthrow.

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Sudanese leaders were reassured by Washington's willingness to commit its resources to defend Sudan and by pledges of continued assistance. At the same time, the Sudanese are concerned over the publicity that the coup attempt received in Western media. [redacted]

The Sudanese almost certainly also are pleased by Egyptian willingness to help defend Sudan. Nimeiri will continue to look to Cairo and the US for support against Libyan machinations. Given the demonstrated weakness of Sudan's defensive capabilities, Sudanese officials are likely to increase efforts to obtain additional military aid from the US and Egypt. [redacted]

Egypt's Concerns

US alacrity in providing the AWACS aircraft reassured the Egyptians, but the publicity given to US-Egyptian military cooperation touched a sensitive nerve. Cairo is disturbed by press speculation about the role of a team of US defense officials who arrived in Egypt last week and by media reports linking Egypt with US naval movements in the Mediterranean. [redacted]

The publicity is especially awkward for Mubarak, because it comes less than three weeks before he attends the summit meeting of the Nonaligned Movement in India. Egyptian officials are concerned that the image of close military cooperation with the US will hinder Egypt's plans to play a leading role at the meeting. [redacted]

Nonetheless, Egypt is unlikely to change significantly its relationship with the US. Cairo continues to rely on this relationship as the basis for its security, although it has consistently insisted on strict limits to the most sensitive aspects of strategic cooperation. [redacted]

The recent events demonstrated that Egypt's alliance with Sudan is strong and that Cairo will remain willing to use its armed forces to thwart any future Libyan-sponsored challenges to Nimeiri. Egypt's relations with Libya will be even cooler than before but are unlikely to deteriorate substantially unless Oadhafi steps up anti-Egyptian activities. [redacted]

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Uneasiness in Chad

President Habre probably expects that Qadhafi, frustrated again in Sudan, will increase his efforts to overthrow the Chadian Government.

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Even so, Habre's concern over Libyan intentions probably will lead to requests to the US, France, and friendly Arab states for additional military aid. His Army is lightly equipped, overextended, and suffers from severe transport, logistic, and communications deficiencies.

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N'Djamena would be hard pressed to withstand major dissidence in the north as well as in the south. The Libyans have armed and trained at least 1,000 dissidents in the north, and [] providing some weapons and money to 1,600 southern dissidents in the Central African Republic.

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Prospects

Qadhafi's designs on Chad, although a direct outgrowth of the unique history between the two countries, also fall within the Libyan leader's grander scheme for a united, powerful Arab-Islamic superpower. Qadhafi occasionally receives help from such radical friends as South Yemen and his other tripartite alliance partner, Ethiopia. He has largely acted alone, however, motivated by the Arabism of his youth, the current resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, and the political and economic weaknesses of his enemies.

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The Libyan leader is seriously limited by the inability of his military to project power much beyond the country's borders, by a dangerously narrow domestic power base, and by the excesses of his personality and ambitions. He is a true believer in his cause, however, and unlikely to be deterred.

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